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VIABILITY OF ETHANOL MOTOR FUEL I N BRAZIL: 
COST BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS 
SUMMARY 
The study assesses the viability of e tha nol fue l consider ing 
both .priv ate and social costs and benefits. Et hano l costs are 
calcu lat ed for different pr oduct i on scales, locat ions , and govern -
ment subsidies . The results show th at without government financing 
subsidies, ethanol fuel would be priva te l y eco nomical (at May 1981 
prices ) only in Southeast distilleries of appropriate sca l e . 
·Northeast distilleries are uneconomical even with a shad ow wage for 
labor . For e i gn exchange savings from ethanol production are cal -
culated , with the finding that relatively small savings are 
ach ie ved . However , Brazil gains grea t er flexibility in suga r export 
earnings by being able to a lt er th e prod uc t ion mix of ethanol and 
sugar depending on international prices . Social benefits of etha no l 
producti on include grea ter rural employmen t, t he creation of rural 
industrial developme nt "poles, " and national strategic considera-
tions. Yet ethanol from sugarcane has a ls o disp l aced food crops, 
contributed to greater lan d co nc entrat i on , and not r ed uced re gional 
disparities . 
I . INTRODUCTION 
The Brazilian Alco hol Fue l Program (Pr oa lcool) was conceived from 
the union of two poli tica l forces , which f or s i mplicity may be labeled 
economic and social . The econo mic forc e was the ri se in petro l eum 
prices , and the practical necessity for Brazil to p roduce domestically 
more liquid fuel. Et hyl alcoho l from sugarcane had been added to 
gaso l ine in Brazil in varying amounts since the 1930s, and was the 
logical short-term choice. A contributing factor was the depressed world 
suga r market, which left many sugar mill s looking for alternative uses 
for cane . The soc i al for ce for the alcohol program derived f ro m the 
necessity to improve conditions in rur al areas to stem the migration of 
population in to urban areas . Thus Proalcool was born with two ove rridi ng 
goals: t o produce eff ici ently and abunda nt ly a fuel to sub stitute for 
imported petroleum-based gasoline; and to be an instrument of social 
progress , to improve income distribu t ion and th e opportunities for small 
farmers. 
There has been considerable debate in the press and in professional 
1 papers questioning the methods and goals of Proa lcool. This paper 
examin es the viabi li ty of eth~nol production fr om the producers ' perspec -
tive (private costs and be nefits), and then tur ns to examine viability 
from society's perspective (social costs arid bene f its) . The forme r is a 
relatively stra i ghtforward calculation of actual costs of production, the 
~ctual revenues, the resulting profits or losses, and the rates of return 
to private ethanol producers . The calculation of social costs and 
benefits is done on the basis of real opportunity costs of resources used 
and the social benefits resulting f rom production . Because of market 
imperfections and government intervention, the two are usually different. 
In the case of ethanol, government intervention in the market is 
pervasive, sett in g prices for sugarcane and alcohol , providing capital 
subsidies , and the government oil monopoly Petrobras being the sole 
marketing agen t. Consequently , private and socia l costs are substan-
tia lly different . Section I I estimates the private costs and bene f its 
an<l Sec tion III the social costs and bene f its of ethanol fuel in Brazil . 
II. PRIVATE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
To promote alcohol production the Brrtzilian gov ernm ent provided 
80- 90% of distillery investment financing at nominal interest rates well 
1 The most recent criticism is of Michael Barzelay and Scott R. 
Pearson , "The Efficiency of Producing Alcohol Energy in Brazil, " Economic 
Developm e nt and Cultural Change 31 (October 1982) , pp. 131-144 . 
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below the rate of inf la tion. These loan rates varied slightly by loca-
tion, type of distil:).ery and type of raw material. Over the period 
1976-80 nominal interest rates averaged twenty-one percen t per year while 
in f lation averaged sixty-three percent . Thus the real interest rate on 
average was negative forty-two percent . In 1981, facing a financial 
crisis, the government raised nominal interest rates but still maintained 
a negative real interest rate of eight percent . 
Ethanol costs of production are estimated in Table 1 under pre-1981 
and 1981 financing arrangements for both the Northeast and Southeast 
suga r cane regions. Costs for four distillery sizes are shown: "micro" 
(5,000 liters/day) , "mini" (30,000 1/d), "small macro" (120,000 1/d), and 
" large macro (300,000 1/d). The figures are expressed in U. S. dollars 
per gallon, at May 1981 prices (Cr$83 . 67/U.S.$). Data come from field 
. 2 
research conducted durin g eleven months in 1980 - 81 . 
Under pre-1981 financing , in which the subsidy on capital was 
greatest in real terms, the 120 ,000 liter per day plant produced at the 
lowest cost, USS0.70/ga llon in the southeast and US$1.06/gallo n in the 
Northeast . Under the stricter financing terms in 1981 the 30,000 1/d 
plant produced at lowest cost, US$0. 99/ga ll on in the Southeast and 
US$1.39/gallon in the Northeast. These scale effec ts appear because 
d istillerie s of different dai l y capacities have different capital inten-
sities . Capital-intensive plants (like the 129,000 1/d) benefit rela -
tively more from subsidies to capital. 
2 For an in-depth report, see Jonathan B. Wight, "Economies and 
Diseconomies of Sc~le in Ethanol Fuel Production: The Case of Brazil," 
Ph .D. dissertation, Vanderbilt Universi ty, 1982. 
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TABLE 1 
PRIVATE COSTS OF ETHANOL PRODUCTION BY SCALE, LOCATION, 
AND FINANCING TERMS (US$/GALLON AT MAY 1981 PRICES)a 
Scale of Southeast Northeast 
Production Pre - 1981 1981 1981 
(liters/day) Financ ing Financi ng 
Pre - 198lb 
Financing • Financing 
5,000 "micro" 1. 21 1.14 1. 78 1. 70 
30,000 "mini " o. 72 0.99 1.07 1.39 
120,000 "smal l 0 .70 1. 05 1.06 1.49 
macro" 
300,000 "large o. 77 1.00 1.19 1.48 
macro" 
source: Jonathan B. Wight (1982, p . 173) . 
a Cr$83.67/U.S.$ 
b Fin ancing tenns for the Northeast pre-1981 are slightly more 
advantageous than for the Southeast. This difference has been included 
in the analysis. 
Is ethanol production viable under private cost/benefit calcula-
tions? These results show that it is, with notable caveats. The 
government ~s et price for purchasing hydrated alcoho l at the factory gate 
in May 1981 was U. S . $1.14/gallon in the Southeast and U. S. $1.21/gallon ir 
the Northeast . In the Southeast all size distilleries considered are 
economically viable under both pre - 1981 and 1981 financing schemes, with 
the exception of the micro under pre-1981 terms (which r ece ived no 
government financing prior to 1981). In the Northeast all plants except 
the micro are viable under the pre-1981 terms but all become inviable 
with the stricter 1981 t erms . Thus the higher financing costs in 1981 
severely limited the participation of the Northeast in Proalcool. 
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The private cost calculati _ons of ethanol production vary signif i-
cant l y from the social cost calculation , as shown in t he next section . 
III . SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Social costs of production va l ue resources a t their opportun it y 
costs, regard l ess of government fi nancing schemes, minimum wage laws , or 
other distortions . Financing is based on the real opportunity cost of 
3 
capital, assumed to be ten percent . In the Southeast , labor is scarce 
enough for wages t o r ef lect true opportunity costs ,(Borges, 1980 , p . . 41 ; 
World Bank, 1981 , p . 48) , while in the Northeast a shadow wage is 
appropriate. A shadow wage of 70 percent is used , which is the rate 
employed by the World Bank in analyz i ng projects in the Northeast (1981 , 
p . 48). The main effect of the shadow wage will be to lower sugarcane 
costs, since roughly 36 pe r cent of the cost of sugarcane derives from 
payments to unskilled workers, while very litt l e direct labor i s used in 
et hanol production (Bor ges, 1980) . 
Accountin g for the opportun i ty costs of capital and labor allows an 
estimate of social costs of production , found in Table 2. The ana l ysis 
is partial, since not all inputs have bee n evaluated a t the i r opportunity 
costs--e .g ., land , agricultura l capital , and imported inputs . The 
figures show that only the 30 , 000 1/d ' and 300 , 000 1/d plants in the 
Southeast are v i ab l e when government subsid i es are eliminated--again 
us in g the set price of US$1.14/gallon in the Southeast and $1 . 21 in the 
Northeast as benchmarks . Of course , the app r opriate measure of project 
desirabil i ty is to compare the social costs with t he social benefits , not 
the f i xed price set by the government . 
3 Sel ecting an opportunity cost of capital 100 percent higher or 100 
pe r cent lower does not alter the basic findings (Wight , 1980 , p . 159 ). 
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TABLE 2 
PARTIAL ANA~YSISa OF SOCIAL COSTS OF ETHANOL PRODUCTigN 
BY SCALE AND LOCATION (US$/GALLON AT MAY 1981 PRICES) 
Scale of Production 
(liters/per day) 
5,000 "micro" 
30,000 "mini" 
120,000 "small macro" 
300,000 "large macro " 
Southeast 
1.21 
1. 12 
1. 23 
1.12 
Northeast 
1.61 
1.43 
1.58 
1.50 
a This analysis consid e rs the real opportunity cost of industrial 
capital at 10 percent per year, and industrial and agricultural unskilled 
labor in the Northeast at 70 percent of private cost . The analysis is 
partial since not all inputs are evaluated at their opportunity costs. 
b Source: Wight (1982, p. 176). 
The massive push to promote alcohol fuel was based on a larger 
development strategy which sought to unite public support for the pro-
gram . While the main goals of the progra.m are to promote foreign ex-
change savings and stabilize earnings in the sugar industry, other stated 
economic and social goals are: 
--Greater self -r eliance and independence from potentially unreliable 
foreign sources (Brazil ' s main oil suppliers are Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia). 
-- Reversal of the trend of rural-to-urban migration . 
--More balanced inter-regional growth as the Northeast becomes a 
major alcohol supplier . 
--I mproved distribution of income with opportunities for small 
farmers. 
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-- Revitalized domestic capital goods industry which will provide 
most of the distillery equipment . 
--Diminished pollution from cleaner-burning alcohol. 
-- Potential fo ·r Brcl.ii1 to become the world's technological leader in 
alcohol production and use. 
This paper evaluates three of t he stated goals, namely, foreign 
exchange savings, national energy security, and rural development. 
Foreign Exchange Savings 
Determining the magnitude of foreign exchange savings is not a 
simple one-to-one calculation . First, while alcohol cars have better 
pe:i;-formance than gasol ine cars in terms of acceleration, miles per gallon 
is about 25 percent less (Quatro-Rodas, 1980, pp. 36-42} . Second, 
gasoline represents only about 23 percent of refined petroleum production 
in Brazil -- with 27 percent being diesel oil , 28 percent home heating 
oil and 22 percent naphtha, kerosene , aspha l t , and other by-products 
(CNPq, 1980, p . 210} . Even though ethanol may substitu te as fuel for 
gasoline, there is a higher demand for other petroleum ·products such as 
diesel fuel , and thus greater amounts of petroleum must be imported 
regardless . 
The true .cost of gasoline in Brazil is difficult to determine since 
refineries receive government financing, and the refineries , built before 
the oil shock , are now operating with excess capacity. On a retail level 
the price of gasoline is maintained about 40 percent higher than for 
alcohol to stimulate ethanol use, through the use of excise taxes . 
Compared with internat i onal prices, gasoline on the spot market in 
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Rotterdam (May 1981) is US$0. 98/gallon (Conjuntura Economica~ 1982) which 
is 12 percent below _the lowest social cost of ethanol produced in Brazil 
(US$1.1 2/gallcin). 
Even this compari son is misleading because the production of 
sugarcane utilizes a fair amount of petroleum itself. Diesel fuel for 
sugarcane land cultivation amounts to 312 liters per hectare of cane, or 
about 9 liters of diesel used for each 100 li ters of alcohol produced 
(assuming 3,500 liters/ha) (CNPq, 1980, p. 214) . There are additiona l 
petroleum outlays for cane transportation, fertilizers , pesticides , and 
herbicides. The alcohol waste stillage has a fertilizer value which 
diminishes however, the need for chemical fertilizer. 
The production of ethanol requires ·other imported inputs , particu-
larly enzymes and stainless steel . For each ten thousand liters of 
alcohol capacity, about 1 . 3 tons of imported stainless steel is needed . 
Thus to produce 4.5 billion liters of yea rly ethanol capacity (assuming 
150 production days per year) requires about 4, 700 tons · of stain l ess 
steel (CNPq, 1980, p . 227). 
In an ·attempt to quantify the petroleum savings from producing 4.5 
billion liters of ethanol and using it as a fuel, the National Council 
for Scientific and Technological Research (CNPq, 1980, p . 229) evaluated 
costs based on 1976 prices anrl petroleum valued at US$12 .20 per barrel. 
Their results are that each liter of alcohol used as f uel saves about 6.5 
U.S. cents in imported petroleum . If about 4 .5 billion liters of alcohol 
were produced, this would generate almost US$300 million in foreign 
exchange savings . This figure is far less than the total petroleum 
import bill o·f US$3.'6 bi llion in 197 6. With petroleum prices at US$34.28 
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per barrel in 1981, undoubtedly the foreign exchange savings ' are greater, 
but no so great as alcohol proponents would like. Clearly alcohol is not 
a panacea for the petroleum import problem. 
The argument can also be made th at even though ethanol fuel 
generates positi ve foreign exchange, greater amounts of foreign exchange 
could be earned by not using ethanol as a fuel, or not producing ethanol 
at all but using those resources to produce some other export-oriented 
product. As an example of the first case, ethanol sold as a chemical (on 
domestic and export markets) would generate 39 U.S. cents of net foreign 
exchange as opposed to the 6 U.S . cents generated by its use as a fuel 
(CNPq, 1980, p . 230; Borges , 1980, p. 47). As an example of the second 
case, sugarcane could be used to produce more sugar for export rather 
than alcoho l. 
Brazil gains a great flexibil ity in being able to use sugarcane for 
producing either sugar or alcohol , depending on the relative inter-
national prices of these commodities . Borges (1980 , p . 48) calculates 
that after meeting internal demands for sugar and minimum export quotas 
for sugar set by the I nternatio nal Sugar Accord, Brazil in 1980 had about 
32 mil l ion tons of sugarcane which could be used to produce e i ther 3 
billion kgs. of sugar or 1 .8 billion liters of ethanol for use as a 
chemical. That . is, the production trade-off is one liter of alcohol for 
each 1.67 kgs. of sugar. 
If the relative international price ratio of ethanol to sugar is 
greater than 1.67, then clearly ethanol should be produced and exported 
to maximize foreign exchange earnings. Based on the 198 0 international 
sugar price of US$0. 60 per kg. of sugar and US$60 per barrel or US$0. 38 
per litter of ethanol, the ratio of alcohol to sugar prices is 0 . 63, 
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which is lower than the 1.67 production ratio . Sugar should be exported , 
generat i ng US$1.8 bi lli on in forei gn excha nge; if alcohol had been 
exported only 0S$684 million would have been earned. In 1978, however , 
with sugar selli ng for US$0.1 7/kg ., a different policy would have been 
recom.~ended . 
This calculation assumes quite importantly that the i nterna t ional 
sugar price would not change given Brazil's export dec isi ons. Orden and 
Schuh (1980 , p . 17) argue tha t th i s i s a reasonable assumption, and using 
data for 1979 they calculate a hypothetical loss of a l most US$2 billion 
i n foreign exchange if Brazil had produced 7. 6 b i llion gallons of ethanol 
(to substitute for petroleum) rather than producing sugar for export 
(valued at USS0. 28/kg .). 
The assumption of pe rfectly elastic sugar demand must be viewed with 
skepticism , however, considering the large price oscillations observed in 
the internationa l market. During 1977 and 1978 the Brazilian government 
sought to maintain international prices by building up sugar s t ocks equal 
to 33 percent of world sugar consumption (Borges , p . 60). Furthermore, 
the World Bank ' s sugar commodity mode l shows that if Brazil used its 1985 
sugarcane production exclusively for sugar , this would amount to 40% of 
world sugar trade ; inte rnati onal suga r prices would fall by 50 perce nt 
(The World Bank, 1981 , p. 46) . Brazil's share of world sugar trade would 
need to increase from 9 percent to 45 pe r cent to dispose of this sugar , 
in conflict wi th International Sugar Agreements . Thus the option of 
exporting significantly greater quant ities of suga r presents obstacles . 
This shou l d not · imply that ethanol is necessarily the best alternative . 
Other export crops, such as soybeans or cotton , might easily be prefer-
able to ethanol in terms of the opportunity cost of resources . 
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Strategic and Social Benefits 
Proponents of the alcohol program argue that in addition to the 
external .economic benefits significant strategic and social benefits will 
be realized: 1). increased national energy security , and 2) increased 
rural development (particularly in the Northeast) . 
1) National Energy Security 
The first str a tegic benefits were realized sooner than expected when i n 
September 1980 war broke out betw ee n two of Brazil ' s oil suppliers --
Iran and Iraq.' Virtually overnight 40 percent of pe t roleum imports wer e 
cut off . A difficult period ensued , but by rais i ng t he proportion of 
a l cohol in gasoline to 30%, instituting voluntary conse r vation measures , 
and making spot purch ases of petroleum, a major economic and political 
crises was averted. In addition, Proalcool helped maintain automotive 
4 . 
sales at around a million units a year from 1975-80, leading planning 
minis t er Delfim Neto to laud : 
. [Proalcool] is today a fundamental instrument for maintaining 
the automobile industry , without the expansion of which the 5whoie level of development of this country would suffer terribly . 
Proalcool thus gained recognition and respect for the role it played in 
easing po l itical , economic, and social pressures in the late 1970s. 
2) R~ral Developmen t 
A principle socia l objective of Proa l cool is to improve agricultural 
conditions by establishing rural industrial poles , which serve to raise 
4 Due to the recession , sales fell to 800 , 000 units in 1981 . 
5 Quoted i n O Estado de Sao Paulo , 27 November 1980, "Delfim : 
Proalcool e Fator Inflationario" (Author ' s trans la tion) . 
11 
incomes , generate employment , and reduce migration to cities . 6 Unfor-
tunately , the tighter financing · te rms in 1981 effectively cut the North-
east off from furthe r e t hano l development . Of 390 distillery projects 
approved by May~ 1981, over two-thirds are located in the Center/South 
and less than one-third in the Nort h/Northeas t. Thus r egional dispari-
ties b e tween the traditional sugar can e regions in _the Northeast and 
Southeast are not likely to diminish (and may increase) as a resu lt of 
Proalcool . 
The massive push to incre ase sugarcane cultivation resulted in the 
substantial development of unused or frontier lands, particularly i n the 
Center/West regions . · Autonomous 7 distilleries require the sugarcane area 
expansion of 2 . 2 million hectares by 1985 (Table 3) . Sugarcane repre-
sents si x percent of total Brazilian cropland use in 1980 and will 
represent nine percent in 1985, assuming a growth in total cropland . In 
the Southeast, displacement of other crops and livestock pastures is 
occurring . In six subregions in Sao Paulo the new sugarcane land is 
calculated by Pelin (1980, p. 835) to come fif ty- one percent from dis -
placement of domestic food products (rice , beans, and corn) and fo rty 
percent from pastures . Displacement is also found in the south by 
Matuella (1980 , p. 823) . 
Sugarcane is a re l atively labor - intensive crop as shown in Table 4 . 
I f sugarcane disp lac es soybea ns, oranges , rice, or corn the job genera -
tion will be significant , but if it displaces cotton or peanuts jobs will 
be lost in the agricultural sector . Borges (1980, p . 770) calculates 
6 Al coh ol is particularly suited for this since excess sugarcane 
stalks (bagaco) can be burned to provide electricity in rura l areas . 
7 I .e . , not attached to sugarmills . 
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Area 
Location 
1. Traditional 
2 . Expans ion of 
Traditional 
3 . New 
4 . Total 
TABLE 3 
LAND AND SUGARCANE REQUIREMENTS TO 
MEET 19 85 ALCOHOL GOALSa 
Area Cane Production Alcohol Production 
(000s of Ha) (OOOs of tons) (millions of li te rs) 
2 , 300 126 , 500 2 , 837,750 
460 25 , 300 1,771,000 
1 , 740 87 , 018 6,091,2 50 
4,500 239,000 10 ,7 00,000 
Source : Luiz Carlos Correa Carvalho, "Sistema de Pesquisa no Brazil 
Para a Agroindustria da Cana - de - Acucar " (Piracicaba, S . P ., 
PLANALSUCAR, May 1980) . 
a These are the goals as of May 1981 . 
TABLE 4 
LABOR UTILIZATION IN VARIOUS CROPS 
Crop 
Cotton 
Soybeans 
Oranges 
Pea nu ts 
Rice 
Corn 
Sugarcane 
Source : Caron (1980, p. 735) 
Days of Work Per Year Per Hectare 
Non-Skilled Skilled 
60 . 0 
3 . 0 
19 .1 
41.0 
25 . 0 
6.0 
28.0 
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3 . 0 
1. 3 
2 .7 
3.0 
3.0 
2 . 7 
3 . 4 
that by 1985 about 350,000 jobs will be generated directly by the ethanol 
program -- 80,000 in distilleries and 270,000 in agriculture . Con-
sidering dependents about 1.1 million persons will be supported in rural 
areas by the ethanol program. Accounting also for the indirect job 
creation in the domestic goods i ndustry, the automotive industry, and the 
general multiplier effect of the higher incomes, the number of rural and 
urban jobs created is of significance. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Almos·t all observers agree that e thano l fuel would not be economi-
cally viable in Brazil without substantial government subsidies, par-
ticularly in the North/Northeast. (Borges, 1980; Poole, 1979; CNPq, 
1980; Wight, 1982) . Whether such subsidies are justifiable depends on 
the positive externaliti es of production and consumption . Ethanol fuel 
use does save foreign exchange , but -not substantial amounts; and, until 
an alcohol - diese l engine is dev elo ped, petroleum dep en dency is main-
tained. Nevertheless, ethanol capac it y does provide strategic benefits 
by making Brazil less vulnerable to import short falls , and providing a 
boost to the automotive and sugar industries. 
In the rural sector Proalcool has contributed to the massive develop -
ment of new lan ds along with the appropr i ation of existing croplands and 
pastures . This has incidentally resulted in a growing concentration of 
land ownership, at a time when land tenure questions th reat en rural 
stability (Wight, 1982). Regional disparities betwee n the Northeast and 
southe as t - will likely not diminish (and may increase) because of con-
tinuing large production cost differences. Thus in the final analysis 
social aspec ts of the program are not conclusively beneficial. 
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The recent oil-price rollbacks of February 1983 reduce the external 
econom i c benefits of Proalcool and thus reduce the impetus for its 
expansion . This, plus the fiscal austerity demandedby Brazil's I .M.F . 
recovery package , has put the alcohol fuel pr ogram on hold. Despite the 
difficulties , one cannot he l p but admire this ambitious and innovative 
alternative energy effort, in contrast to the "coy mistress 118 who 
prevails over U. S . energy policy -making. 
8 Poole, 1979, p . IV . 
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